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Abstract: Drawing on recent quantitative research on Europe reaching back to the
medieval period, and noting a relationship between the quality of institutions and
economic growth, this paper offers a reassessment of Africa’s growth prospects.
Periods of positive growth driven by trade, followed by growth reversals which wiped
out the gains of the previous boom, characterized pre-modern Europe as well as
twentieth century Africa. Since per capita incomes in much of sub-Saharan Africa are
currently at the level of medieval Europe, which did not make the breakthrough to
modern economic growth until the nineteenth century, we caution against too
optimistic a reading of Africa’s recent growth experience. Without the institutional
changes necessary to facilitate structural change, growth reversals continue to pose a
serious threat to African prosperity. Only if growth continues after a downturn in
Africa’s terms of trade can we be sure that the corner has been turned.
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21. INTRODUCTION
African countries have achieved impressive rates of economic growth since the mid-
1990s, second only to those of East Asia. This has generated debates about whether or
not Africa has now turned the corner and started on a path of sustained economic
growth. Optimists point not only to a boom caused by high prices for primary
commodities, but also to improved macroeconomic policies, democratization, and the
transformation of industrial and service firms by information and communications
technologies (Radelet 2010). However, more pessimistic commentators point to
continued political instability, corruption, and weakness in transport and energy
infrastructure (Kalema 2011; Arbache and Page 2009). Both optimists and pessimists
have looked back to the period of rapid growth following the end of World War II and
its subsequent reversal in the 1970s. Optimists have argued that this reversal was the
result of the challenges of decolonization and that conditions now are different.
Pessimists have suggested that the export-led growth of the current boom is similar to
that of the 1950s and 1960s.
A longer view of Africa’s economic history demonstrates that periods of rapid
growth are nothing new (Jerven 2010; Prados de la Escosura 2012). Recent research
on economic performance during the colonial period has shown that particularly prior
to the Great Depression, much of Africa achieved positive growth. The expansion of
cash crop exports during the nineteenth century also reflected an earlier period of
growth. However, these growth episodes have historically been followed by severe
reversals, which have limited overall improvements in per capita income. Both the
periods of growth as well as the reversals have been driven by changes in the external
demand for primary commodities.
Recent research reconstructing GDP per capita figures for Europe from the
thirteenth century has illustrated that European history exhibits the same pattern
before the mid-19th century (Broadberry et al 2012). The success or failure of export
commodities, particularly wool, stimulated both periods of rapid growth as well as
periods of negative growth, resulting in long-term stagnation. This research also
suggests that levels of per capita income in medieval Europe were substantially higher
than previously thought, so that the medieval period should be seen as the starting
point of the road to sustained growth rather than as the embodiment of all things
backward (Britnell and Campbell 1995). The first transition to modern economic
growth occurred in the North Sea Area (van Zanden, 2009). The success of this
transition was the result of institutional change which allowed the North Sea
economies to escape the pattern of growth reversals (North, Wallis, and Weingast
2009).
This paper uses European economic history to identify key levels of per capita
GDP and relates them to the institutional changes which underpinned the transition to
sustained economic growth. It then applies this framework to the African experience
since 1950. This comparison suggests a less optimistic scenario for Africa, for three
reasons. First, the necessary institutional changes have not taken place in most
African countries. Second, per capita income levels today are at about the same level
as in medieval Europe. Third, the pattern of growth followed by reversals can persist
for very long periods of time, with no inevitable transition to modern economic
growth.
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development in the recent past and European development during the medieval and
early modern periods. However, previous studies have been limited to a qualitative
approach (Bates 2010; Fenoaltea 1999). This paper offers the first empirical
comparison of Africa’s growth patterns since 1950 with those of Europe since the
thirteenth century.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 notes the similarity of the experience
of growth reversal in Africa since 1950 and in much of pre-modern Europe, but also
the transition of a number of European economies to sustained economic growth by
the nineteenth century. Section 3 analyses the institutional developments in Europe
during the transition to sustained economic growth. These institutional developments
are associated with a reduction in growth reversals, thus leading to a positive
relationship between institutions and the level of per capita income. Section 4
analyses some of the barriers to the required institutional changes in African
countries. Section 5 then maps Africa into the same income categories as in pre-
industrial Europe and discusses African institutions and growth prospects in this light.
2. COMPARATIVE GROWTH REVERSALS
2.1 Data sources and methods
This section draws parallels between the growth reversals of European economies
before the onset of modern economic growth and the experience of African
economies since 1950. Figures 1 to 4 report GDP per capita figures in 1990
international dollars, which is convenient for making comparisons across both space
and time. Economic historians have often used GDP per capita levels in constant
international dollars to draw lessons from comparing economies at similar stages of
development, but at different points in time (Chenery and Syrquin 1975; Crafts 1984;
Maddison 1995). For each country, GDP is measured in local currency, but converted
to constant price terms by correcting for price changes over time with a 1990 base
year. The conversion to a common currency involves comparison of local prices in
1990 with dollar prices in the same year, and a weighting scheme based on
international rather than just US patterns of consumption. In 1990, the World Bank
poverty level for an individual was a dollar a day, or $365 a year, so the minimum or
‘bare bones subsistence’ level of GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars is
usually taken as $400, since even the poorest economies have a small elite with much
higher levels of income.
For Europe, annual data on GDP per capita are now available for Spain, Italy,
Britain and Holland reaching back to around 1300. It should be noted that these
estimates are based on hard data assembled within a national accounting framework,
and represent a considerable advance on the ‘guesstimates’ provided by Maddison
(2001; 2003; 2010) for the pre-1820 period, where many observations were set at
$400 in 1990 international prices by assumption rather than with reference to data
from that period. For some European countries, including Britain and the Netherlands,
abundant quantitative information has survived, so that historical national accounts
can be rebuilt in great detail (Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van
Leeuwen, 2011; van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2012). For other countries, including
Italy and Spain, Malanima (2011), Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2012)
and others have developed a short-cut method for reconstructing GDP from more
limited information. For agriculture, this involves deriving the demand for food from
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for foreign trade. For non-agriculture, this involves the use of data on the urbanization
rate, again with adjustments for specific factors such as agro-towns and rural proto-
industry.
For Africa, annual data on GDP per capita between 1950 and 2008 are taken
from Maddison (2010). These estimates are broadly consistent with the World Bank
series from 1960. Efforts to reconstruct GDP figures for Africa before 1950 remain
speculative. However, a recent study by Prados de la Escosura (2012) presents
estimates based on projecting an econometric relationship between the income terms
of trade and GDP per capita in the post-1950 period back into the pre-1950 period
where data on the income terms of trade are available. These estimates show that
growth reversals were prevalent before as well as after 1950. In particular, most
African countries suffered a sharp reversal during the depression of the 1930s.
2.2 Growth reversals in Africa
Studies of African economies in the 1990s tended to emphasize the trend of slow or
no growth since the 1960s. For example, the ‘Africa dummy’ literature inspired by
Barro (1991) focused on explaining why African countries seemed to have lower rates
of growth which were not explained by the variables generally used to predict
economic growth. More recent research into African economic performance over a
longer period of history has illustrated that it is not a story of persistent failure, but
rather of periods of growth, followed by reversals which largely erase any gains made
during the growth spurt. Since 1950 most African countries have followed a general
pattern of growth and reversal. Two decades of relatively rapid growth from 1950
until the 1970s ended with the crisis of the 1970s, and were followed by stagnation or
negative growth in the 1980s and 1990s (Ndulu and O’Connell 2008). In most
countries, the recent revival of growth began in the late 1990s, redeeming some of the
losses of the previous two decades. This pattern of growth is associated with external
demand for natural resources and cash crops (United Nations 2012: 3).
However, the growth patterns of African countries also reflect the diversity of
the continent as a whole. Figures 1 and 2 give GDP per capita for four African
countries from 1950 until 2008. They illustrate substantial differences between
countries in both their starting point in 1950 as well as their experiences since.
Different resource endowments as well as the unique political histories of each
country have resulted in different growth paths, though none have achieved sustained
economic growth.
The wealthiest country, in both 1950 and 2008, was South Africa, which
became the continent’s economic leader following the mineral discoveries of the 19th
century. Its per capita GDP in 1950 was $2,591, substantially higher than the other
three countries (see Figure 1). Foreign investment and public revenue generated by
the gold mines allowed the South African government to pursue an aggressive
strategy of state-led industrialization in the 1920s, from which time it has been the
most industrialized economy in sub-Saharan Africa (Feinstein 2005). Manufacturing
outpaced mining and agriculture as South Africa’s leading industry by the 1970s, and
later in that decade its GDP per capita peaked at $4,480, a level only regained in
2006. During the 1980s increasing political instability, resulting from protests against
the repressive apartheid regime, combined with a falling gold price, led to a period of
5economic contraction, only reversed with the introduction of majority rule in 1994
(Fedderke and Simkins 2012).
Post-independence political conflict also resulted in several growth reversals
in Nigeria. In 1958 the World Bank claimed that Nigeria’s prospects for growth based
on agricultural exports (including palm oil, cocoa, groundnuts, cotton and rubber)
were good, but that they depended on ‘Nigerians’ success in eliminating tribal or
regional antagonisms and maintaining reasonably high standards in public
administration’ (World Bank, 1958: 2). The Biafran War of the late 1960s reversed
earlier gains, and GDP per capita fell to below its 1950 level (Iyoha and Orioaki
2008). The oil booms of the 1970s led once again to positive growth, but oil revenue
had little lasting impact on per capita GDP, which declined in the 1980s and remained
stagnant through the 1990s. Since 2000, oil production and expansions in agriculture
and services have led to a period of renewed economic growth (OECD, 2012).
Kenya’s economic performance since 1950 has been less volatile than the
other countries shown in Figures 1 and 2, but it shares many features with the other
cases. Kenya’s economic success in the 1950s and 1960s was due largely to
agricultural exports, but Kenya also benefitted from its dominant position within the
East African economy. However, mismanagement of revenue earned in the 1970s
coffee boom, along with the increasing use of state funds for political patronage led to
poor economic performance during much of the 1980s (Mwega and Ndung’u, 2008).
A brief recovery during the late 1980s was ended by outbreaks of ethnic violence
following elections in 1992 and 1997 (Elischer, 2010). This was compounded by
droughts and high oil prices due to the Gulf War (Mwega and Ndung’u, 2008).
By far the poorest country in 2008 was Sierra Leone, which enjoyed favourable
prospects in 1950 owing to its mineral wealth (Herbst, 2000; Clapham, 1976). While
it kept pace with the other countries profiled here until the early 1970s, the transition
to an increasingly repressive one-party state in 1973 resulted in stagnating per capita
GDP of around $1,100 a year. The major decline came with the outbreak of one of
Africa’s deadliest civil wars in 1991, which was funded in part through illicit
diamond sales (Reno, 1998). Although there has been recovery during the 2000s,
following the official end of the war in 2002, per capita incomes in 2008 remained no
higher than in 1950.
In each of these cases, efforts to stimulate recovery from reversals had limited
success until the next commodity boom. Faced with the possibility of new downturns,
African producers focused on ensuring subsistence rather than maximizing
production. The limited recovery of agriculture following the structural adjustment
programmes of the 1990s is one example. Even after state intervention in export
markets was removed, improving potential incomes for producers, expansion in
export production was slow. During the crisis period, producers had diversified their
income streams and shifted towards subsistence production or production for the
black market (Sahn and Sarris 1991). Growth reversals ended only when the prices
for primary exports increased dramatically once again.
2.3 Growth reversals in Europe, 1270-1870
New estimates of national income per head in European countries between the 13th
century and the mid-19th century also suggest a pattern of periods of economic
6growth followed by growth reversals, consistent with the experience of Africa since
1950. This underlines the point that low standards of living in pre-industrial
economies are due not to persistent failure, but rather to inconsistency, so that the
fruits of short run success are quickly lost. As in Africa, per capita GDP fluctuated in
tandem with the fortunes of export commodities such as wool and long-distance trade
in luxury items such as silk and spices (Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura,
2012; Power, 1941; Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007).
The general pattern of long run stagnation with alternating periods of growth and
growth reversals is well illustrated by the cases of Italy and Spain in Figure 3. Italyhad an unusually high level of per capita income in the late medieval period,which is often attributed to the key role of city states such as Venice and Genoain long distance trade, thus creating a vibrant urban life with a thriving marketeconomy (Luzzatto, 1961; Lane, 1966; Kindleberger, 1996; Maddison, 2001).Venice played a crucial role in the revival of trade between Asia and Europe,establishing naval supremacy first in the Adriatic Sea, then in the easternMediterranean, linking up in the Middle East with the Silk Road from China.Genoa established a similar hegemony in the western Mediterranean. Theubiquity of war at this time meant that state power was essential to defend themerchants carrying on this long distance trade. Avoiding war requireddiplomacy, at which the Venetians excelled, and these diplomatic skills wereused to pursue commercial interests. Venice exploited good relations with theChristian states established in the Middle East during the Crusades, and whichsurvived until 1291, after which the Venetians also managed to establish goodrelations with the Islamic Mamluk regime. The Venetian state created aninstitutional framework that was favourable to merchant capitalism, including:political and legal institutions to guarantee property rights and enforcecontracts; a government bond market, starting with compulsory loans on whichinterest was paid regularly; a fiscal system that was favourable to merchantprofits and capital accumulation; and a tolerant state so that foreign merchantscould operate freely. However, Venice (and Italy more generally) suffered agrowth reversal after 1500 due to two major developments which underminedVenice’s role in trade between Europe and the East. First, restrictions on tradewith Syria and Egypt imposed by the Ottoman Empire when the Mamluk regimewas overthrown, and second, competition from direct Portuguese shipmentsbetween Europe and Asia on new trade routes round Africa.Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2012) argue for two epochs inpre-industrial Spain. In the first epoch, from the 1270s to the 1590s, sustainedprogress was interrupted by the Black Death and then resumed from the 1390s.During this period, Spain was a relatively high income society with a high land-labour ratio. When the Black Death struck, it had a negative effect on Spanishincomes, in contrast to much of the rest of Europe, where it reduceddemographic pressure. By destroying commercial networks and increasingisolation amongst an already scarce population, the Black Death reduced Spain’sability to maintain per capita production. Renewed expansion from the 1390soccurred on the basis of a wool staple, the production of which was well suited toa land-abundant society, and stimulated the rebuilding of commercial networksboth nationally and internationally. By the end of the sixteenth century, real
7output per capita was close to its pre-Black Death level and Spain had built anempire and become an economic centre connecting Europe and the New World.The second epoch, running from the 1600s to the 1800s, began with a sustainedfall in per capita income which lasted from the late sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century. The crisis involved a decline in wool exports from 1570, acontraction in the purchasing power of American silver from the earlyseventeenth century, and an inward re-orientation of the Spanish economy. Therising costs of empire put a strain on the fiscal system and the cities, whilepopulation pressure led to an extension of agricultural cultivation. Economicrecovery only took place in the eighteenth century, and when per capita incomesagain reached the level of the 1590s at the beginning of the nineteenth century,Spain was no longer an Empire and a link between Europe and the New World.
The cases of Britain and Holland in Figure 4 also illustrate how a small part of
Europe, in the North Sea Area, broke the mould and made the transition to modern
economic growth (Broadberry, Campbell, van Leeuwen and van Zanden 2012). This
resulted in a reversal of fortunes between the North Sea Area and Mediterranean
Europe, known as the ‘Little Divergence’. Whereas Italy and Spain had higher levels
of per capita income than Britain and Holland in the early 14th century, Britain and
Holland were clearly ahead of Italy and Spain by the 19th century. The first growth
spurt in Britain and Holland occurred following the Black Death and subsequent
outbreaks of plague from the mid-14th century. What is novel here is that in contrast
to Italy, per capita incomes remained on a higher plateau rather than returning to their
pre-1348 level.
A second wave of growth followed, led by Holland during its Golden Age
1500-1650 and then by Britain from the mid-17th century. Economic historians haveoften pointed to long distance trade as playing an important role in this post-1500 ‘Little Divergence’ between the North Sea Area and Mediterranean Europe,following the opening up of new trade routes to Asia around the south of Africa,and to the New World following Europe’s encounter with the Americas. It mightbe expected that Spain and Portugal would have been the gainers from thesechanges, since they were the pioneers and both had Atlantic as well asMediterranean coasts. However, the key to breaking out of the cycle of growthbooms and reversals was a set of institutional changes which will be consideredin detail in the next section. Britain and Holland managed both to (1) build statecapacity to ensure the security of property rights and (2) to provide a means bywhich merchants were able to limit the power of rulers to intervene arbitrarilyin matters of business.As Britain and Holland made the transition to modern economic growth,they also left behind a system of agricultural production which had persistedacross much of northwest Europe since medieval times. Under the open fieldsystem, grain was grown in scattered plots of unfenced land, usually subject tocommunal decision-making. At the same time, a small amount of grain wasgrown on enclosed land, where scattered holdings had been consolidated andfenced, and where peasant households could exercise exclusive control overdecision-making. The persistence of the open field system until the eighteenthcentury is at first sight surprising, since although the scale of the efficiency
8advantage of enclosure has been questioned, its positive sign has normally beenaccepted (Clark, 1998). However, rather than just seeing this as an example ofthe persistence of an inefficient institution due to the difficulties of collectiveaction where the opposition of a single stakeholder can block change, McCloskey(1972) argued that the scattered landholdings of the open field system should beseen as a form of insurance, with peasant households spreading the risk of lowyields by holding a diverse portfolio of land. Although the precise nature of theargument has been challenged by Bekar and Reed (2003), their emphasis onpeasants using small parcels of land as a savings instrument remains consistentwith the fundamental idea of peasants sacrificing income to ensure security. Thisis something which we shall see still persisting in the poorer parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
3. INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF SUSTAINED ECONOMIC
GROWTH
3.1 Institutions and development in Europe
The transition to modern economic growth occurred first in Britain during the
Industrial Revolution (Kuznets, 1966). Sustained growth then spread quickly to other
countries in northwest Europe with similar institutional frameworks (North, Wallis
and Weingast 2009). During that process, a ‘Little Divergence’ occurred between
northwest Europe and the rest of the continent. Insights from the new institutional
economic history suggest that that the crucial institutional differences are linked to an
appropriate balance between the building of state capacity but at the same time
ensuring sufficient constraints on arbitrary behaviour by the executive.
In the case of Britain, which was the first country to achieve modern economic
growth, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 embodies that balance. On the one hand, by
giving legitimacy to the tax raising powers of Parliament, it permitted the growth of
state capacity and a unified domestic market, as stressed in Epstein (2000) and
O’Brien (2011), with their emphasis on the centralization of state power and the rise
of the ‘fiscal state’. On the other hand, by confirming the supremacy of Parliament,
the Glorious Revolution placed effective constraints on the executive powers of the
Crown, as emphasized by North and Weingast (1989) and Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2005).
However, it is important to realize that the Glorious Revolution was just one
stage in a process of institutional development, and that its effects were not felt
overnight (Stasavage, 2002). Although trust and security of property rights can be
destroyed overnight, building them up takes time. There is empirical evidence to back
up the gradual development of both aspects of the role of state institutions in the
European Little Divergence. Early modern Britain and Holland pulled away from
Spain and Portugal in terms of both the ability of the state to raise taxes that allowed
for an expansion of state capacity and the control exercised by mercantile interests
over the state through parliament. Table 1 on the ability of the state to raise fiscal
revenue per capita shows a pattern of divergence between northwest Europe and the
rest of the continent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with England
and the Dutch Republic forging ahead. Table 2 also shows very different patterns of
parliamentary activity in the North Sea Area and Mediterranean Europe from the
twelfth to the eighteenth centuries. The index of parliamentary activity constructed by
van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker (2012) is based on the calendar years per century in
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activity was higher in Spain and Portugal than in the North Sea Area. However,
activity then peaked in the fifteenth or sixteenth century in Spain and Portugal before
going into decline. In the North Sea Area, by contrast, although parliamentary activity
was slow to get going, it continued to increase after 1500, reaching very high levels
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These themes will be discussed
further in the context of debates about the role of institutions in African economic
performance.
3.2 Institutions and growth reversals
The data in Tables 1 and 2 are suggestive of a relationship between institutional
structures and growth reversals. Poor countries with weak institutions appear to be
vulnerable to growth reversals which limit long-run gains in per capita GDP.
Institutional change, involving both the growth of state capacity and parliamentary
control over the executive, is therefore required to reduce the frequency and severity
of growth reversals. An important part of the transmission mechanism between
institutional change and the end of growth reversals in Europe was sustained
structural change, with the emergence of large and growing specialized industrial and
service sectors (van Zanden and van Leeuwen 2012; Broadberry, Campbell, Klein,
Overton and van Leeuwen 2011). Growth began, therefore, to become much less
dependent on staple commodities that were vulnerable to periodic growth reversals,
but rather began to be spread across a much wider range of activities.
This growth of specialised industrial and commercial sectors can be seen to
have proceeded faster in Holland and Britain than in the rest of Europe in Table 3. By1600, the release of labour from agriculture had proceeded further in theNetherlands than in the rest of Europe, as the Dutch economy relied increasinglyon imports of basic agricultural products such as grain and paid for them withexports of higher value added products (de Vries and van der Woude, 1997). By1700, the share of the labour force engaged in agriculture was even smaller inEngland, where a highly commercialised agriculture produced enough grain tofeed the population without recourse to substantial imports (Deane and Cole,1967; Crafts, 1985). The share of the labour force in agriculture remainedsubstantially higher in the rest of Europe. This high degree of specialisationrequired a state with the capacity to enforce property rights and create a unifiedmarket, but also strong parliamentary control over the executive to preventarbitrary interference in business.
The idea of a link between institutional structures and growth performance has
been confirmed in the literature on new institutional economics. The association is
bolstered by cross country growth regressions for the post-World War II period which
show dummy variables for democracy as raising the growth rate (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2003). Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009) identify a more precise link, which
they test empirically. The specific mechanism runs from democratization to the
absence of growth reversals, and hence to a permanent increase in the level of per
capita income. Kishtainy (2011) builds on this approach to demonstrate a link
between North, Wallis and Weingast’s (2009) notion of an open access social order
and the absence of growth reversals. However, the experience of early modern
Europe suggests that it is necessary to consider the growth of state capacity as well as
constraints on the executive.
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4. INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
As in the literature on Europe, studies of institutional obstacles to growth in
Africa have exhibited a tension between the need to increase the capacity of the state,
and the importance of constraining its ability to violate property rights. Jerven (2010:
129-30) identifies two generations of literature on African economic growth since the
1960s. The first generation literature argued that a major source of growth failures
was the intervention of African rulers in the market for largely political purposes. One
of the main purposes of the structural adjustment reform programmes implemented in
the 1980s and 1990s was to limit the ability of African rulers and ruling parties to
interfere in the markets in order to capture rents with which to reward supporters. The
second generation of institutional literature has looked for reasons why African states
have relied on political structures dependent on rent-seeking and patron-client
networks. Explanations have included geographical endowments like low labour-land
ratios and the legacies of colonial rule.
Historians have also attempted to explain the origins of weak state capacity
and the prevalence of patron-client relationships in African polities. Cooper (2002)
describes African states as ‘gatekeeper states’, which depend on controlling access to
external markets in order to maintain their authority. Gatekeeper states use this
control to incentivize cooperation by clients, who rely on the state to gain access to
trading profits and imported goods. The ‘gatekeeper state’ description applies equally
to pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence states. These features of African
states have proven to be highly resistant to reform. The expansion of the franchise and
political competition at independence was one of the major sources of optimism about
Africa’s future in the 1950s and 1960s. Unfortunately, the democratic institutions
introduced at independence came under threat almost immediately in many countries,
as public funds were used for patronage projects and democratic governments
replaced by dictatorships and one-party states.
Tables 4 and 5 set out trends in fiscal revenues and constraints on the
executive in Africa, corresponding to Tables 1 and 2 for Europe. The first thing that
stands out from Table 4 is the early lead in tax revenue per head for South Africa
during the colonial period. Although there was some variation amongst the other
states, they all raised much less revenue per head than South Africa. The data from
the post-independence period continue to show a substantial South African lead in
fiscal capacity, this time expressed as a share of GDP. Table 5 presents polity scores
for the same four countries. In the Polity IV database, the polity index score is
obtained as the democracy index score minus the autocracy index score, which can
vary between -10 (no democracy and complete autocracy) to +10 (full democracy and
no autocracy). Again, South Africa stands out as having an early high polity score.
Nigeria, Kenya and Sierra Leone all exhibit substantial reversals in their polity scores.
Africa optimists point to the recent improvement of the institutional structures to
strengthen democracy and weaken autocracy, and this trend is apparent in Table 5.
However, it needs to be seen against the absence in Table 4 of an upward trend in
fiscal revenues as a share of GDP over the same period. Increasing constraints on the
executive without strengthening fiscal capacity may not lead to better government.
The European experience suggests that state capacity and constraints on the executive
need to increase together.
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5. PARALLELS BETWEEN EUROPE AND AFRICA
5.1 A quantitative overview of European economic development
Figures 1 to 4 have provided estimates of GDP per capita in Africa since 1950 and in
Europe 1270-1870 in 1990 international dollars. This facilitates a direct comparison
of African economic development in the recent past with historical development in
Europe. To provide some specific lessons for policy makers today, it will be useful to
identify some critical levels of per capita GDP in European development and map
contemporary African economies into these levels.
The estimates in Table 6 suggest that western Europe was already well above
bare bones subsistence ($400) by the late Middle Ages, with average per capita GDP
in England and Holland around $750 on the eve of the Black Death in 1348, and
substantially higher than this in Italy and Spain. Our first income category will
therefore be less than $750. This can be seen as applying to the whole of Europe
during the early medieval period, when state institutions were fragmented and weak.
Wickham emphasizes the importance of patronage networks in maintaining the fragile
states which emerged following the collapse of the Roman Empire (Wickham 2005:
387-93).
Our second income category is $750 to $1,500. At the lower end is included
England and Holland before the Black Death struck in 1348. The upper end of this
range corresponds to the level of per capita GDP in central and north Italy during the
late middle ages, a highly commercialized and prosperous society for its time.
Holland reached the upper end of this range during the late 16th century and England
around the time of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Despite having an elaborate
bureaucracy since at least the 12th century, England continued to experience bouts of
instability until the 17th century. Between the Black Death and the Glorious
Revolution, for example, internal power struggles within the dominant coalition led to
the Wars of the Roses during the 15th century and the Civil War of the 17th century.
The revolt of the Dutch against the Habsburg rule of the Low Countries, which led to
the foundation of the Dutch Republic in the late sixteenth century, also illustrates the
instability of the Spanish state. The notorious power struggles between families in the
Italian city states such as Florence, Venice and Genoa also suggest continued
instability in northern Italy.
The third income category is $1,500 to $2,000. The upper end of this range
corresponds to Britain in 1800, by which time the Industrial Revolution and the
transition to modern economic growth were in full swing, and urbanization was
proceeding rapidly. Holland had reached this level by 1570, the start of its Golden
Age. Holland after the foundation of the Dutch republic and Britain after the Glorious
Revolution were both characterized by stable systems of governance with reformed
bureaucracies capable of raising the substantial fiscal resources shown in Table 2
(O’Brien, 2011; Karaman and Pamuk, 2010)). Organizations outside the state sphere,
such as banks, also began to take on a more durable form, underpinned by the
growing use of the legal system in commercial transactions (Cameron, 1967; Harris,
2000; McLeod, 1988).
The fourth income category is over $2,000, a level reached in Holland after
1600 and in Britain after 1800. Both countries at this stage made significant
institutional changes which both increased state capacity and imposed constraints on
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the executive. Early modern Britain and Holland dominated other European countries
in terms of both their ability to raise taxes that allowed for an expansion of state
capacity and in the control exercised by mercantile interests over the state through
parliament (O’Brien 2011; Karaman and Pamuk 2010; van Zanden, Buringh and
Bosker 2012). In Holland, these institutional developments followed the revolt against
the Spanish rulers in the late sixteenth century. In Britain, the seventeenth century saw
major institutional change following the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution. By
the nineteenth century, patronage played a more limited role and economic and
political opportunity was more open, as demonstrated by the repeal of the Corn Laws
against the interests of the landed gentry, and the reform of the professions known
colloquially as the ‘end of Old Corruption’ (Rubinstein, 1983; Schonhardt-Bailey,
2006).
5.2 Per capita income levels in pre-modern Europe and modern Africa
Table 7 maps the countries of sub-Saharan Africa into the above four income
categories. Perhaps the most striking finding is that most sub-Saharan African
countries today have per capita incomes that are on a par with medieval European
economies. Indeed, only a handful of countries have per capita incomes higher than
Britain at the start of the nineteenth century. It should be remembered that many
European economies which had already by the 14th century reached the per capita
income levels of sub-Saharan Africa today, continued to stagnate for another 500
years. The next step will be to consider the cases of four African economies, one from
each income group, and see how their institutional development compares with that of
Europe on the path to modern economic growth between 1270 and 1870.
Our first case study is Sierra Leone, with a per capita income level below
$750. Institutions in Sierra Leone share many of the characteristics of the weak states
of early medieval Europe, including the extensive use of patronage and vulnerability
to exogenous shocks. These features are prominent in the literature on Africa’s failed
states. Reno (2000: 434) describes the reliance on patronage systems as a ‘shadow
state’, in which rulers use their ability to intervene in markets to strengthen their
political base. With the transition to independence, which gave greater political voice
to groups marginalized during the colonial period, the colonial coalition of coastal
elites was no longer sufficient to maintain stability. The country’s descent into civil
war resulted from the combination of fragile institutions along with ripple effects
from the conflict in neighbouring Liberia (Reno, 1998).
Our second case study is Kenya, with a GDP per capita level between $750
and $1,500. This places Kenya at the same level as highly commercialised late
medieval economies. Countries at this level of income have highly developed
bureaucratic institutions but are not immune to instability, as the examples from
Europe illustrate. Kenya’s recurrent ethnic violence has been one source of recent
instability. The connection in Kenya between ethnic violence and elections highlights
the dangers of introducing democratic institutions taken from models developed in
countries with high levels of per capita income to countries with low levels of per
capita income (Barro 1999: S179). Due to the link between ethnicity and party
allegiance in Kenya, party competition in elections can also be described as
competition between ethnic groups, which often leads to violence. In Kenya,
privileged access to economic resources was one of the ‘carrots’ used to ensure the
support of ethnic coalitions. Parallels can be drawn here with the granting of
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privileges by medieval and early modern rulers in Europe. According to Epstein
(2000), such privileges undermined market integration in Europe and needed to be
removed by a centralizing state.
Our third case study is Nigeria, with a per capita GDP between $1,500 and
$2,000. This corresponds to Holland after 1570 and Britain after 1750. Comparable to
these European cases, Nigeria is home to a vibrant private sector with strong
commercial interests able to exercise constraints on the executive. In 2012 the OECD
noted that the private sector employed 80 per cent of Nigeria’s workforce and
generated most of its exports. However, the state remains vulnerable to factional
disputes along both religious and regional lines which threaten both security and
economic growth. This is also linked to the low share of tax revenue in GDP, which
means that state capacity remains highly limited.
South Africa, with a per capita GDP of more than $2,000, is the fourth case
study. This corresponds to the level of per capita income reached in Holland by 1600
and Britain by 1800. Improvements in state capacity alongside constraints on the
executive allowed both countries to dampen growth reversals and therefore achieve
sustained economic growth. South Africa is notable among African countries for
relatively high levels of state capacity, particularly in tax collection. However, efforts
to constrain the actions of the ruling African National Congress are still ongoing
(Fedderke and Simkins 2012; OECD 2012).
The cases discussed here illustrate clearly both the diversity of African state
institutions as well as the institutional foundations of growth reversals. They suggest
a less optimistic assessment of Africa’s growth prospects than that provided by Bates,
Coatsworth and Williamson (2007), which also makes use of economic history,
comparing Africa’s experience since decolonization in the 1960s with that of Latin
America in the 19th century. However, their optimistic conclusions for Africa’s future
growth prospects depend on stopping the Latin American story in the early 20th
century. They argue that Africa’s experience of economic and political upheaval
following the end of colonial rule resembles that of Latin America’s ‘Lost Decades’
between 1820 and 1870, and that the change in Latin America’s fortunes following
this initial period bodes well for Africa’s prospects in the 21st century. However, the
Latin American growth of the pre-World War I commodity boom was followed by
significant growth reversals during the 1930s and again during the 1980s.
6. CONCLUSION
Improvements in the growth performance of many African countries in the first
decade of the twenty-first century have prompted speculation about whether Africa
has now escaped from the pattern of boom-and-bust growth which characterized its
economic performance in the twentieth century. Proponents of this view highlight
Africa’s rapid growth since the mid-1990s, which has been second only to that of East
Asia, as well as the trend towards democratization during the 1990s. However,
placing the current boom in a longer-term historical context shows that such
optimistic predictions are far from certain. As was the case in previous growth
episodes, high external demand for natural resources – particularly oil, but also land
and cash crops – is at the heart of the rapid growth rates achieved by African
countries in the previous decade.
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The European case illustrates that the pattern of rapid economic growth
followed by reversals can continue over very long periods – in Europe’s case, half a
millennium. Europe only made the transition to sustained economic growth with
institutional change, encompassing a balance between constraints on the executive
and the growth of state capacity. The level of per capita GDP in many African
countries today is comparable to Europe in the middle ages, and the necessary
institutional change has not yet occurred. Although the recent strengthening of
democracy in countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra Leone has increased
constraints on the executive, this has not been matched by a growth in state capacity.
In South Africa, by contrast, where state capacity is already relatively high, the
growth of constraints on the executive remains an ongoing struggle. Growth reversals
therefore continue to be a real possibility.
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FIGURE 1: GDP per capita in South Africa and Nigeria, 1950-2008 (1990
international dollars, log scale)
Source: Derived from Maddison (2010).
FIGURE 2: GDP per capita in Kenya and Sierra Leone, 1950-2008 (1990
international dollars, log scale)
Source: Derived from Maddison (2010).
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FIGURE 3: Real GDP per capita in Italy and Spain 1270-1850 (1990
international dollars, log scale)
Source: Malanima (2011); Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2012).
FIGURE 4: Real GDP per capita in Britain and Holland, 1270-1870 (1990
international dollars, log scale)
Source: Broadberry, Campbell, van Leeuwen and van Zanden (2012).
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TABLE 1: Per capita fiscal revenues in Europe, 1500/09 to 1780/89 (grams of
silver)
1500/09 1550/59 1600/09 1650/59 1700/09 1750/59 1780/89
Dutch Republic -- -- 76.2 114.0 210.6 189.4 228.2
England 5.5 8.9 15.2 38.7 91.9 109.1 172.3
France 7.2 10.9 18.1 56.5 43.5 48.7 77.6
Spain 12.9 19.1 62.6 57.3 28.6 46.2 59.0
Venice 27.5 29.6 37.5 42.5 46.3 36.2 42.3
Austria -- -- -- 10.6 15.6 23.0 43.0
Russia -- -- -- -- 6.3 14.9 26.7
Prussia -- -- 2.4 9.0 24.6 53.2 35.0
Ottoman Empire -- 5.6 5.8 7.4 8.0 9.1 7.1
Poland 1.5 0.9 1.6 5.0 1.2 0.8 11.2
Source: Karaman and Pamuk (2010: 611).
TABLE 2: Activity index of European parliaments, 12th to 18th centuries
(calendar years per century in which parliament met)
12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th
North Sea Area
England 0 6 78 67 59 73 100
Scotland 0 0 10 61 96 59 93
Netherlands 0 0 0 20 80 100 100
Mediterranean
Castile and Leon 2 30 59 52 66 48 7
Catalonia 3 29 41 61 16 14 4
Aragon 2 25 38 41 19 11 1
Valencia 0 7 28 29 12 4 0
Navarre 2 7 17 33 62 30 20
Portugal 0 9 27 47 12 14 0
Source: van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker (2012: online appendix S1).
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TABLE 3: Share of agriculture in the European labour force (%)
England Netherlands Italy France Poland
1300 -- -- 63.4 -- --
1400 57.2 -- 60.9 71.4 76.4
1500 58.1 56.8 62.3 73.0 75.3
1600 -- 48.7 60.4 67.8 67.4
1700 38.9 41.6 58.8 63.2 63.2
1750 36.8 42.1 58.9 61.1 59.3
1800 31.7 40.7 57.8 59.2 56.2
Source: Derived from Broadberry, Campbell and van Leeuwen (2013); Allen (2000:
8-9).
TABLE 4: Fiscal revenues in Africa
A. Colonial period (£ per head, current prices)
South
Africa
Nigeria Kenya Sierra
Leone
1911 2.88 0.15 0.30 0.33
1921 4.71 0.26 0.64 0.41
1931 4.03 0.25 1.00 0.50
B. Since independence (% of GDP)
South
Africa
Nigeria Kenya Sierra
Leone
1990 -- -- 19.5 5.6
1995 -- -- 21.6 9.4
2000 26.3 -- 19.7 11.4
2005 30.1 9.4 20.2 8.7
2010 28.8 9.7 20.3 9.8
Sources and notes: Colonial period: Total tax revenue in current £ divided by total
population, from Gardner (2012). Since independence: Cash receipts from taxes,
social security contributions and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent and income
form property or sales, expressed as a share of GDP, from The World Bank: Data
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.REV.XGRT.GD.ZS). Grants are also
considered as revenue but are excluded here.
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TABLE 5: Polity index scores in Africa (range -10 to +10)
South
Africa
Nigeria Kenya Sierra
Leone
1910 4 -- -- --
1950 4 -- -- --
1960 4 8 -- 6
1970 4 -7 -7 1
1980 4 7 -6 -7
1990 5 -5 -7 -7
2000 9 4 -2 0
2010 9 4 8 7
Sources and notes: Polity IV database
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm). The polity index score is obtained as
the democracy index score minus the autocracy index score. Details of the
components of the indices are set out in Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2013).
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TABLE 6: GDP per capita levels in Europe (1990 international dollars)
England/
GB
Holland/
NL
Italy Spain
1086 754 -- -- --
1270 759 -- -- 957
1300 755 -- 1,482 957
1348 777 876 1,376 1,030
1400 1,090 1,245 1,601 885
1450 1,055 1,432 1,668 889
1500 1,114 1,483 1,403 889
1570 1,143 1,783 1,337 990
1600 1,123 2,372 1,244 944
1650 1,100 2,171 1,271 820
1700 1,630 2,403 1,350 880
1,563
1750 1,710 2,440 1,403 910
1800 2,080 2,617 1,244 962
1,752
1820 2,133 1,953 1,376 1,087
1850 2,997 2,397 1,350 1,144
Sources and notes: England/Great Britain: Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and
van Leeuwen (2011); Broadberry and van Leeuwen (2011); Holland/Netherlands: van
Zanden and van Leuwen (2012); Italy: Malanima (2011); Spain: Álvarez-Nogal and
Prados de la Escosura (2012). Figures are for 10-year averages starting in the stated
year (i.e. 1270-79, 1300-09,…) apart from 1348, which refers to the pre-Black Death
years 1339-48, and 1086, the year of the Domesday survey.
21
TABLE 7: 2008 GDP per capita Levels in Africa (1990 international dollars)
< $750 $750 - $1,500 $1,500 - $2,000 > $2,000
Burundi Benin Angola Botswana
Central African
Republic
Burkin Faso Ghana Congo-
Brazzaville
Chad Cameroon Lesotho Equatorial
Guinea
Dem. Republic
of the Congo
Côte d’Ivoire Nigeria Gabon
Guinea Djibouti Sudan Mozambique
Guinea Bissau Eritrea Namibia
Malawi Ethiopia South Africa
Niger Gambia Swaziland
Sierra Leone Kenya
Tanzania Liberia
Togo Mali
Mauritania
Rwanda
Senegal
Somalia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Source: Derived from Maddison (2010).
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